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Introduction
The sustainability of public debt has assumed greater significance as an economic policy issue since the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis. In the wake of that crisis, budget deficits and public debt levels rose sharply as governments around the world increased budget spending as a countercyclical measure. Meanwhile, sources of government revenue collapsed due to the widespread downturn in economic activity (IMF 2013) . Two key questions inevitably arise for any government whose stock of public debt keeps growing: is the public debt trajectory stable or unstable and, if unstable, what budgetary stance is required to bring public debt under control?
Many authors have examined the issue of government debt sustainability, mainly with reference to developing and emerging economies, based on the relationship between budget deficits and public debt accumulation (see for instance Buiter 1985 , Fischer and Easterly 1990 , Frederickson 2001 , Hemming, Kell and Schimmelpfennig 2003 , Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 2003 , Bohn 2008 , Budina and Van Wijnbergen 2009 , Escolano 2010 , IMF 2010 , Hernandez and Gamarra 2011 , Rangarajan and Srivastava 2012 , Ghosh, Ostry and Qureshi 2013 , and Tanner 2013 . In light of the large increases in the public indebtedness of most OECD member countries post-crisis, debt sustainability analysis has also become increasingly relevant to advanced economies.
To date, research addressing the above questions has mainly centred on public debt sustainability at the national level. Yet in many economies, fiscal positions have also seriously deteriorated at sub-national level, including in Australia's States and Territories which are the focus of this paper. There is a surprising dearth of academic literature examining sub-national public debt in Australia, despite the extensive data provided by the The higher public debt levels of Australia's States and Territories not only imply an increased burden for the future taxpayers of those jurisdictions, but also raise economic risks in the present. For instance, according to standard macroeconomic models, the demand for domestic funds from sub-national governments, when aggregated, puts upward pressure on domestic interest rates and appreciates the economy's exchange rate. This crowds out private investment and net exports via worsened industry competitiveness, which limits growth in the wider economy.
A sub-national government's public debt becomes unstable when it continues to increase as a proportion of that jurisdiction's production, or Gross State Product (GSP), because interest payments on the debt keep adding to budget deficits, and hence the public sector borrowing requirement without limit. The probability of default rises as public debt escalates, as recognised by the major credit rating agencies, Standard and Poor's (2010) and Moody's (2013) . These agencies monitor a range of institutional and financial measures, including the ratio of debt to tax revenue, that are closely related to the debt/GSP ratio (in part because there are economic and political constraints on the share of tax revenue to GSP). Downgrades to creditworthiness that reflect this risk raise the interest premium that lenders require as compensation which further swells public debt interest obligations, leading to a vicious circle of deficits and debt 1 .
In this paper we show that the capacity of sub-national governments in Australia to meet their debt obligations essentially depends on the following factors -the size of public debt relative to GSP, the effective servicing cost of that debt relative to GSP and the size of the primary budget balance. The primary budget balance is defined as the conventional fiscal cash surplus (+) or deficit (-) but excludes the impact on the balance of public debt interest payments 2 .
The primary balance is central to debt sustainability analysis since, together with interest payments on previously accumulated debt, it governs the rate at which public debt accumulates. Governments directly control the primary fiscal balance through discretionary fiscal measures that alter either public spending, revenue-raising, or both. Unlike at federal level, there is no scope for monetising budget deficits at State level, so no financing via seigniorage occurs.
A state's budgetary stance becomes untenable if its public debt to GSP ratio (and associated debt to tax revenue ratio) exceeds a level lenders will support at prevailing interest rates.
Exactly what this level is can vary from state to state, depending on the nature of the government spending or transfers being funded and how quickly debt has accumulated. If public debt escalates rapidly, sub-national governments need to decide whether merely stabilising debt to GSP is sufficient. If not, then a lower debt to GSP target has to be set. 
Sub-national Public Sector Borrowing and Debt: Recent Trends
Stabilising Sub-national Public Debt
In this section we examine the stability of public debt with reference to a formula relating key variables which is first derived and then empirically applied to the relevant sub-national data.
Arithmetic Foundations
The government budget constraint provides the basis for conveying public debt dynamics and for determining the fiscal response needed for debt stabilization. This constraint simply states that public debt (D) in the present period equals previously accumulated debt, plus public debt interest, paid at an effective interest rate of i, plus the Primary Deficit (or less the PB). In discrete time, this can be expressed as
or alternatively, this can be rewritten as
where g is the nominal rate of economic growth.
Taking the change in the public debt to national income ratio 
Equation (6) shows that public debt to GSDP rises, as the primary deficit and interest rate rise and as the rate of nominal economic growth (g) falls. To stabilize public debt to national income,
or simply
where pb is the primary balance to income ratio and μ is the previous period debt to income ratio.
The relationship between nominal and real interest rates is
where * r is the real interest rate and  is the inflation rate, and the relationship between nominal and real growth is
Hence, through substitution, and assuming small product terms are negligible, (8) can also be written as
If the interest rate exceeds the growth rate, a primary surplus is required for debt stabilization, whereas if the growth rate exceeds the interest rate, a primary deficit is possible. Hence, we have shown that in estimating the requisite primary balance, it makes no significant difference if nominal or real values are used for the interest and growth rates, the key driver being the difference between these respective values.
This derivation abstracts from 'seigniorage' which occurs when budget deficits are money financed by central banks. Seigniorage effectively provides an additional source of 'revenue' to national governments and, if used in a limited way, is not necessarily inflationary if increased real money demand associated with buoyant economic growth matches the money supply expansion due to the money financing of budget deficits. At state level however, seigniorage is in any case irrelevant, since state governments are unable to money finance their budget deficits.
Empirical Results
Relation (8) is now combined with recent data on budget deficits, debt levels, prospective GSP growth rates and effective interest rates to estimate the primary balances required to stabilise sub-national public debt levels. Public debt, budget deficit and interest rate data for the state governments is available from Government Finance Statistics (ABS 2012-13) and state domestic product data from Australian National Accounts: State Accounts (ABS 2012-13). As prescribed by equation (8), this data yields values for state government primary balances that stabilise debt levels expressed as a proportion of GSP. These values can then be compared to actual primary balances. If the actual values exceed the stabilising values, public debt ratios are falling whereas if actual values are less than stabilising values, public debt ratios are rising. Using the concepts in the preceding section and equation (8) we can derive the data in Tables 1A and 1B (in which red shows debt/GSP is unstable). (8) (8) 
Reducing Sub-national Public Debt
The foregoing analysis has estimated the primary balances necessary to stabilise debt ratios at existing levels. However, if very high, a level that has been stabilised may not necessarily be sustainable into the future. Instead, a lower target value may need to be achieved by a certain time, for example within three years, five years or ten years. If so, the fiscal consolidation has to be greater. The following derives a key formula for estimating the primary balance required to achieve targeted debt levels at some time in the future.
Arithmetic Foundations
Solvency requires that present debt, t D can eventually be repaid at some time in the future, 
Now the stock of public debt at some time hence will depend on the pre-existing debt less the discounted sum of future primary surpluses, such that 
If the debt to income ratio is reduced to a proportion  of the existing ratio between t and 
(1 ) n n n j t t j j tn n t n t 
Solving (20) (22) where pbis the primary balance to income ratio and  is the current period public debt to income ratio  is the proportion of the targeted debt to GDP ratio to the current ratio and n is the number of years allowed to achieve the target ratio.
Empirical Results
Given the substantial escalation in debt/GSP ratios over the past decade, it can be argued that stabilising debt at its current higher level is an inadequate goal for sub-national fiscal policy.
Alternatively, State and Territory governments could aim to restore their public debt/GSP ratios to previous 10 year average levels. Estimates of the primary balances required to achieve such a target based on equation (22) are shown in Charts 3A and 3B. In general, the more time sub-national governments have to achieve this target, the smaller their annual primary surpluses need be. Required PB to achieve target debt/GSP in 3 years Required PB to achieve target debt/GSP in 5 years Required PB to achieve target debt/GSP in 10 years
The analysis shows that no sub-national government had a general government primary balance in 2012-13 sufficient to bring general government debt/GSP back to its 10 year average in either 3, 5 or 10 years assuming the balance outcome in 2012-13 is sustained for the period. With the exception of Tasmania, the total public sector primary balance for all
States and Territories was insufficient to bring public sector debt/GSP back to its 10 year average in either 3 or 5 years, while only NSW and Tasmania recorded a primary surplus sufficient to achieve the target in 10 years 6 .
The above analysis has used the ten year average of general government or total public sector debt to GSP as a suitable "target". There have been policy recommendations that the appropriate target for general government debt is lower than this "target". Prior to the rapid growth in State debt in Queensland from the mid 2000s, the Queensland government was committed to what was called the "trilogy". The part of the trilogy relevant to debt policy was variously described, but can be summarised as a requirement that "borrowings be restricted to assets that generated their own revenue stream to service the debt" 7 . This is equivalent to saying that the general government sector should not borrow and that general government debt should be zero. The Victorian Independent Review of State Finances (2011) recommended that: "General Government net debt is equal to zero on average over a 10-year rolling period" 8 . Based on the financial assets and liabilities of Victoria in 2012-12 (ABS, Finance Statistics, 2012-13) , this is consistent with gross debt of 3% of GSP, lower than the 10 year average of 4% and the 2012-13 level of 9%.
Government
6 For Tasmania, this outcome arises because its total public debt/GSP in 2012-13 is below the 10 year average. The 10 year average debt/GSP for Tasmania is nearly twice the national average and therefore an inappropriate target. For NSW the primary surplus arises due to sale of non-financial assets and the surplus may not therefore be sustained. 7 Queensland Commission of Audit (2102) Interim Report, Brisbane, p53. More recently the Queensland Government has committed to maintaining a general government fiscal balance (which includes capital purchases) and hence, by implication, maintaining a primary budget surplus. See Queensland Government, Budget Strategy and Outlook, Budget Paper No 2, 2014-15, p 6. If the target debt/GSP for the general government sector was set in line with these more restrictive prescriptions, then the required level of general government balance over a 3, 5 or 10 year period would be even larger than estimated above.
Primary Balances Based on Budget Forward Estimates
The above analysis has illustrated some important underlying dynamics of debt stabilisation. year average and Victoria which is 1.7 times the 10 year average.. Ongoing primary surpluses will be required to stabilise debt at these higher levels and even higher primary surpluses (and corresponding higher taxes or lower expenditure to GSP) necessary if debt/GSP is to be reduced to long-term averages. 
Summary and Policy Implications
This paper has first advanced and then applied some principles for assessing the sustainability of public debt at sub-national level in Australia. Examining public debt ratios at this level is important because excessive debt levels can threaten sub-national governments' creditworthiness with adverse consequences for future budgets. Public debt interest obligations on the outlays side of budgets can rise suddenly, leading to a vicious debt-deficit cycle in the event of credit-rating downgrades, or due to heightened exposure to a generalised rise in interest rates.
Over the longer run, when the interest rate can be expected to exceed the growth rate, stabilising the debt/GSP ratio will require permanently achieving a primary budget surplus, with the required primary surplus being higher the higher is the current debt/GSP ratio (refer equation 11). This shows very starkly that, to achieve stable debt/GSP over time, incurring deficit and debt in the current period will require permanently higher primary budget surpluses, which in turn require higher taxes or lower expenditure relative to GSP. If the policy objective is to reduce debt/GSP to long term averages even more restrictive tax or expenditure policies are required.
The foregoing has identified the size of primary budget balances required to stabilise and reduce State and Territory public debt levels. However, it has remained silent on the normative question of how best to achieve the required primary balances through expenditure restraint, improved revenue raising, or some combination of the two. Circumstances for each sub-national government obviously differ and the scope for cutting public expenditure more limited for some sub-national governments than others due to large non-discretionary elements for essential services and the need for growth enhancing infrastructure development.
Restraining public expenditure can limit economic growth at sub-national level if productive infrastructure spending rather than more politically sensitive current expenditure is cut.
Meanwhile, sub-national tax revenues as a proportion of GSP, at 5 per cent on average, (see Chart 7). Tasmania, the NT and SA have the highest net financial liabilities to GSP in part due to the high levels of unfunded superannuation liabilities to GSP which are poorly covered by financial assets.
In addition, the debt measures used in this paper exclude deposit liabilities held by State public sector entities which are small (less than 0.5% for all State and Territories in aggregate) and comprise deposits from other public sector or private sector bodies and trust accounts held on behalf of other public sector or private bodies. These deposits do not actively fund the borrowing requirements of public sector entities. Moreover, proceeds from advances received are not included, as these include loans received from government authorities for policy purposes rather than income generation/liquidity management (refer 
